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Abstract
We show that the simple fact that a monopolist sells a good in units
which are indivisible may well induce him to select a quality for his product
which is not the highest one, even if no cost of any sort is attached to quality
improvement.
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1. Even leaving aside price discrimination, the list of perverse effects of
monopoly power identified by economists is already impressive. To our surprise,
the following note reveals that a new item should be added to it, in circumstances
in which intuition would have predicted the contrary.
The first item on the list is certainly the fact that a monopolist sells too little
an amount of the good he produces, and at a too higher price, compared with the
amount and the price which would be optimal from the viewpoint of consumers.
Also, when the monopolist sells several variants of the same product, the range
of variants he decides to supply generally differs from the range which would
maximise consumers welfare ; sometimes he offers too many variants, sometimes
too few of them (Gabszewicz (1983)).
Several perverse effects have also been listed, which are related to the quality of
the product which is selected by the monopolist (see Tirole (1988)). In particular,
when the cost of producing a good depends on its quality, the monopolist selects
a quality which differs from the quality which would be optimal to produce, given
the relationship between cost and quality, and taking again consumers welfare
as criterion. Yet, when the unit production cost of a product does not increase
with its quality, it seems obvious that it is always optimal from the viewpoint of
the monopolist to select the top quality among all the variants which are avail-
able to him. The intuition behind this statement is that the willingness to pay
of consumers necessarly increases with quality, and thus the price at which the
monopolist would maximise revenue. Since by assumption there is no restraint
coming from cost increase related to quality improvement, the monopolist should
always increase his profit when improving the quality of his product. Thus, at
least in this extreme case, it seems that both the monopolist and consumers share
parallel interests : what is optimal for the latter, is as well optimal for the former.
Still in other words, monopoly product selection here appears as immune against
the usual perverse effects which so frequently conduce to welfare disappointing
results. Unfortunately, the present note reveals that, even in this most favourable
case, our basic intuition must be subject to qualification. We show indeed that
the simple fact that the monopolist sells a good in units which are indivisible may
well induce him to select a quality for his product which is not the highest one, even
if no cost of any sort is attached to quality improvement. Thus, as a by-product,
our analysis also puts in evidence that the list of perverse effects of monopoly
power is probably far from being closed !
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2. A very popular model providing microfoundations to market demand anal-
ysis was proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978), and afterwards extensively used
by economic theorists interested in product differentiation and other aspects of
industrial economics. The basic ingredients of the simplest version of this model
can be briefly described as follows. Consider a market for some commodity which
is bought in indivisible units by consumers represented as points θ in the unit
interval [0, 1] with unit density. If consumer θ buys one unit of the good at price
p, his utility is given by θu − p, while, if he does not buy, his utility is given by
0 ; we call u the utility index of the product. To find market demand, it is then
sufficient to identify the consumer θ1 who is indifferent between the alternative
of buying one unit of the product at price p or not buying at all, namely, the
consumer for whom the equality
θu− p = 0
holds, or
θ1 =
p
u
.
Market demand is then given by
D(p, u) = 1− p
u
,
which, combined with the unit density assumption, implies that consumers who
purchase the good, buy a single unit of it. To analyse product differentiation, the
model is slightly enriched in order to include the possibility for the consumer to
select not only among the alternatives of buying or not, but, in the first case, to
select also which variant of the product he wishes to buy, at the exclusion of the
other(s). Again it is assumed that if a consumer decides to purchase a specific
variant, he buys only a single unit of it. This way of defining the decision set open
to consumers reduces the quantity decision to a binary choice : one or zero unit.
A basic result, concerning quality selection under monopoly, follows almost
trivially from the above model of market demand. Suppose indeed that the prod-
uct is sold by a monopolist who produces the good at zero cost, and selects the
market price p. Then revenue writes as
R (p, u) = (1− p
u
) p
and is maximal when p∗ = u
2
with corresponding revenue R (p∗, u) equal to u
4
.
Assume now that the monopolist is also allowed to choose the quality of his prod-
uct, and selects it within a given range of variants leading to utility indices u in
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the interval [u−, u+]. Since no cost is attached to quality improvement, he will
always select the top quality leading to the utility index u+ : equilibrium revenue
is increasing in u. Hence, at least in this model, consumers’ welfare losses due to
monopoly are restricted to those arising from a too higher selling price and a too
smaller volume exchanged, but do not extend to the selection of the product itself
: households will always be offered the best one. Besides this conclusion extends
to the version of this model used to analyse price competition with vertically dif-
ferentiated goods : when costs related to quality are uniformly equal to zero, the
firm selling the high quality variant always selects at price equilibrium the highest
quality.
3. Even though durable goods are generally bought in indivisible and single
units, assuming 0 -1 quantity decisions about the purchase of these goods often
constitutes a too drastic simplification. This becomes particularly true with the
observed increase in living standards through the population, which allows many
households to be equipped with several units of the same indivisible product. In
rich countries today, it is far from seldom to observe households equipped with two
or three different cars, or several TV-sets. Similarly, it is not difficult to identify
consumers owning two or three different houses for their personal use only.1 The
above simplified model is not able to capture such situations, and cannot explain
how a monopolist should revise his pricing or product quality decisions when the
market also includes consumers who may be considering buying more than a single
unit of the good.
It is not difficult, however, to adapt this model in order to take into account
the fact that houdeholds may also be interested in consuming more than one
unit of the good, while keeping the property that the good is still consumed in
indivisible units. To this end, let us now assume that the quantity decision set of
each household is extended to also include the possibility of buying two units of
the good, and denote by φ(u) the utility index associated with this new option.
Of course, the utility of buying two units at unit price p depends on the utility
index u obtained from consuming already a single unit, and also on the fact that
the consumer has now to pay twice the price p. Consequently, if consumer θ buys
two units of the good at a unit price p, his utility is now assumed to be given
1Households selecting to buy several units of a same good often purchase different variants
of that good : most consumers owning two cars, own two different models of cars. This cannot
be taken into account in our case, since by assumption the industry is under monopoly and the
monopolist sells a single variant only. See, however, Gabszewicz, Sonnac and Wauthy (2000)
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by θφ(u) − 2p. In order to introduce an assumption which is the analog of the
assumption of decreasing marginal utility in the case of a perfectly divisible good,
but formulated now for our present case of indivisible purchases, we shall assume
throughout that
φ(u) < 2u :
the utility index corresponding to the consumption of two units of the good is
smaller than twice the utility index corresponding to the consumption of a single
unit of it. Denote by θ2 the consumer who is indifferent between buying at unit
price p two units of the good and not buying at all, i.e. the value of θ satisfying
the equality θφ(u)− 2p = 0, or
θ2 =
2p
φ(u)
.
Similarly, denote by θ12 the consumer who is indifferent between buying at unit
price p one unit of the good and two units of it : the value of θ satisfies θφ(u)−2p =
θu− p, or
θ12 =
p
φ(u)− u.
Direct comparaisons show that, under the assumption φ(u) < 2u, we have neces-
sarly θ1 < θ2 < θ12.
Given a unit price p, consumers in the interval [θ1, θ12] buy only a single unit
while those in the interval [θ12, 1] buy two units : only consumers with the higher
willingness to pay are willing to buy two units. Notice that if p is too high, there
may be no consumer who would like to buy two units ; this happens when the
interval [θ12, 1] is empty, or when p ≥ φ(u)− u. Consequently, when the quantity
decision set of the household is extended to also include the possibility of buying
two units of the good, the demand function of the monopolist now becomes
D(p, u) = 1− p
u
if p ≥ φ(u)− u, and
D(p, u) = (1− p
u
) + (1− p
φ(u)− u)
if 0 ≤ p ≤ φ(u) − u. Figure 1 depicts the demand function D(p), which exhibits
a corner at the value of p equal to the difference between the utility indices
corresponding to the purchase of one or two units of the good.
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uD(p)
p
ϕ(u)− u
Figure 1:
Keeping the assumption that production takes place at zero cost, the revenue
function then writes as ,
R(p, u) =
(
1− p
u
)
p
when p ≥ φ(u)− u, and
R(p, u) =
[
(1− p
u
) + (1− p
φ(u)− u)
]
p
when 0 ≤ p ≤ φ(u).
It is now easy to examine how, given the utility index u, the monopolist
should revise his pricing decision when the market also includes consumers who
may be considering buying more than a single unit of the good. When the price
maximising revenue lies above φ(u) − u, it must satisfy the first-order necessary
condition
∂R
∂p
|p ≥ φ(u)− u| = 1− 2p
u
in which case this price p∗ obtains as
p∗ =
u
2
,
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with a corresponding revenue R(p∗, u) equal to u
4
. When, on the contrary, revenue
is maximal at a price p∗∗ which is less than φ(u) − u, the first-order necessary
condition then implies that
∂R
∂p
|p ≤ φ(u)− u| = 2− 2p
u
− 2p
φ(u)− u = 0
which in turn implies
p∗∗ =
u [φ(u)− u]
φ(u)
.
In that case, it is easy to check that the corresponding demand D(p∗∗, u) is equal to
1, so that the resulting revenue R(p∗∗, u) is equal to p∗∗. From a direct comparison
of R(p∗, u) and R(p∗∗, u), we see that the monopolist will select a price which
induces some customers to buy two units of the good whenever
φ(u) ≥ 4u
3
.
Otherwise he behaves as if this alternative would not exist. In the admissible
domain D = {(u, φ(u)) : u ≤ φ(u) ≤ 2u}, two subdomains must be distinguished,
namely,
D1 =
{
(u, φ(u)) : u ≤ φ(u) ≤ 4u
3
}
and
D2 =
{
(u, φ(u)) :
4u
3
≤ φ(u) ≤ 2u
}
,
with p∗ as the monopoly solution in D1, and p∗∗ in D2.
As a by-product, the above analysis reveals that the assumption according
to which consumers buy only a single unit whenever they buy, is far from being
innocuous. In a large range of situations, -namely, those corresponding to the
domain D2-, this assumption leads to truncate the ”true” demand function since,
for any price p smaller than φ(u) − u, demand is taken as equal to 1 − p
u
, while
it is, in fact, equal to (1− p
u
) + (1− p
φ(u)−u). This would not matter, inasmuch as
it would not affect the market solution ; but, as seen above, it does it whenever
the pair (u, φ(u)) belongs to the domain D2, a large domain indeed. In the next
section, we show that it may affect not only the pricing decision of the firm but
also the manner in which the monopolist selects the quality of his product.
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4. Now that we have characterised the price monopoly solution when allowing
households to buy also two units of the good, we can examine the problem of
quality selection by the monopolist under the same circumstance. To this end let
us assume that the domain of variants which can be selected by the monopolist
leads to the set of utility indices [u−, u+]. If, for all values of u in this domain, the
pair (u, φ(u)) ∈ D1, it is not difficult to see that the optimal quality selection for
the monopolist again consists in choosing the highest quality leading to the utility
index u+ : equilibrium revenue is then equal to u
4
in D1 and is thus monotone
increasing in u. Now let us consider the other possibility in which, for all values
of u in this domain, the pair (u, φ(u)) ∈ D2. Surprisingly enough, we show that,
in spite of the fact that no cost is attached to quality, no similar statement can be
formulated in that case. Consider indeed the following example. Let the domain
[u−, u+] be the interval
[
2
3
, 6
5
]
and assume that, in this domain, the relationship
between u and φ(u) is given by
φ(u) = 1 +
u
2
.
Figure 2 provides a geometric representation of φ(u) and the corresponding ad-
missible domain of utility indices.
It is easy to check that, for all u in the admissible domain
[
2
3
, 6
5
]
, the corre-
sponding pair (u, φ(u)) ∈ D2 : in this admissible domain, it is always optimal to
select the price p∗∗, so that R(p∗∗, u) is then defined in D2 by
u[φ(u)−u]
φ(u)
, that is, in
our case,
R(p∗∗, u) =
u (2− u)
2 + u
.
Since ∂
2R(p∗∗,u)
∂u2
< 0, the necessary and sufficient condition for R(p∗∗, u) to reach a
maximum in u is that∂R(p
∗∗,u)
∂u
= 0, or, denoting by uˆ the solution of this equation,
uˆ = 2
(√
2− 1
)
.
Since uˆ is in the admissible domain of utility indices
[
2
3
, 6
5
]
, but strictly smaller
than the utility index corresponding to the top quality u+ = 6
5
, we conclude that
the monopolist does not select the highest quality in it, in spite of the fact that
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uu− u+
ϕ(u)
Figure 2:
we have assumed that cost does not increase with quality ! Hence, a new perverse
effect appears since, in our context, efficiency requires to choose u+.
It is not easy to explain in intuitive terms why this surprising paradox arises
in our example. In fact, it follows from a simultaneous displacement of the kink
and of the slope of the lower branch of the demand function, when we consider it
as a function of u in the domain D2.. When u increases, the difference φ(u) − u
monotonically decreases so that the kink of the demand function takes place for
a smaller and smaller price. On the other hand, the slope of the lower branch of
the demand function does not vary monotonically with u, which entails that the
value p∗∗ is a rather complicated function of u (namely the function u[φ(u)−u]
φ(u)
). It
is not difficult, then, to build the paradox.
5. An objection which could be raised against the above example is that the
monopolist could still reach a higher revenue if he would refrain from selling the
good one unit at a time, but would allow consumers to buy only two units as a
bundle. Denote by π the price proposed for the bundle. Monopolist’s revenue
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then writes as
R(π, φ(u)) = (1− π
φ(u)
)π
and reaches its maximal value at π∗ = φ(u)
2
, with a corresponding equilibrium
revenue R(π∗, φ(u)) equal to φ(u)
4
. It is easy to see that, if (u, φ(u)) ∈ D2, the
difference R(π∗, φ(u))−R(p∗∗, u) is positive if and only if (φ(u)− 2u)2 is positive,
which is always the case, so that it is clearly more profitable to sell only bundles .
Since in that case revenue R(π∗, φ(u)) is again monotone increasing in the quality
u, the example covered by section 4 would not be really meaningful.
Is this a valid objection against our above example ? We do not think so
because, if the monopolist would adopt the policy consisting in selling bundles
only, he would expose himself to the arbitrage of some consumers willing to buy
two units of the good in order to resell one unit of them to other consumers who
are interested in buying a single unit, but not two units of it. In our context, this
standard arbitrage argument takes the following form. Consider the consumer θ
= 1
2
who is indifferent between buying a bundle of two units at price π∗ and not
buying at all. This consumer would be willing to resell one of the two units in the
bundle at any price which would exceed the price p0 defined by the conditionu
2
−
φ(u)
2
+ p0 = 0 : indeed, the left-hand term of this equality is his utility level after
buying the bundle at price π∗ and reselling one unit of it at price p0, while the
second term is his utility level after the purchase of the bundle at price π∗. On
the other hand, any consumer θ in the interval
[
φ(u)−u
2u
, 1
2
]
would be willing to buy
such a unit at price p0 = 1
2
[φ(u)− u], because he would then reach a utility level
equal to θu − 1
2
[φ(u)− u], which is positive if θ ∈
[
φ(u)−u
2u
, 1
2
]
. Since φ(u)−u
2u
< 1
2
due to the assumption φ(u) < 2u, the set of consumers willing to buy a unit
of the good at price p0is non-empty, giving rise to an advantageous transaction
between consumer θ = 1
2
and any consumer θ in the interval
[
φ(u)−u
2u
, 1
2
]
. Certainly
the monopolist is willing to avoid such a threatening competition ; this should
prevent him to restrict the choice of consumers to the sole purchase of bundles,
thus opening also the faculty of buying a single unit of the good as well. This
is probably why the sale of bundles consisting of two identical units of the same
consumers’ durable good is never observed in practice.
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